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BOOK REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW By Robert F. Nagel.*
University of California Press, 1989. Pp. 232, including
index.
Reviewed by Randolph J. May**
Robert F. Nagel's slender new volume, Constitutional Cultures: The
Mentality and Consequences of Judicial Review,' should be recommended
reading for those interested in the always lively debate concerning the appro-
priate role of judicial review in our constitutional system. While much of
the material contained in Nagel's book has been published previously as sep-
arate essays, 2 these essays, when brought together, present a strong case for
what Nagel perceives as an encroachment by the United States Supreme
Court on public policy decisionmaking that properly should be left to the
other branches of the Federal Government or to the states.3
At bottom, Professor Nagel's thesis is that the "routinization of judicial
power" over the past three decades is one of the main enemies of our na-
tion's constitutional order.4 As a result of this excessive exercise of judicial
power, he believes a wide gap has developed in this country between what he
calls the "legal culture" and the "political culture." 5 This gap has under-
* Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. B.A.,
Swarthmore College, 1968; J.D., Yale University, 1972.
** A.B., Duke University, 1968; J.D., Duke University, 1971. Mr. May is currently a
partner at Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds, Washington, D.C.
1. R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989).
2. Nagel lists these essays in his acknowledgements. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at xi.
3. I say encroachment by the Supreme Court because, although Nagel's subtitle and
some parts of his text might lead one to assume a broad scale concern with excessive judicial
intervention at all levels of federal and state courts, in fact, his book focuses almost exclusively
on decisions of the Supreme Court.
4. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 2-3.
5. Id. at 1. While the distinction between the so-called "legal culture" and the "political
culture" is crucial to Nagel's thesis, and he uses these terms throughout the book, he never
defines what he means by the two terms in any substantive way. He does provide a cursory
explanation in the first two sentences of the book: "The meaning of the Constitution of the
United States, of course, emerges from the adversarial arguments and judicial opinions that
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mined popular respect for constitutional principles and the general health of
our political system.
In Nagel's mind, the judiciary is now viewed as so antagonistic to the
popular culture that "the courts' basic function has become that of critic and
reformer of the general culture." 6 It was one thing for the Supreme Court to
attack one aspect of what Nagel describes as "regional culture" in Brown v.
Board of Education, 7 but, it is quite "another thing for the current Court to
isolate itself from the general culture, retaining ties of language and intellec-
tual approach only to an academic elite. '"8
Nagel finds it troubling that we turn to "a short, old legal document" to
decide contemporary issues relating to family life, "the proper way to sus-
pend a public school student, or . . . the correct relationship between the
Congress and the executive agencies administering the welfare state."9 If the
issue of judicial intervention were fresh (as in the pre-Brown era) "it would
seem so much simpler and more direct for courts to admit that the Constitu-
tion either does not bear at all, or bears only in complex and indeterminate
ways, on most specific public issues." 1° In fact, Nagel argues that courts
make up the legal culture. It is less commonly appreciated that the Constitution is also ex-
pressed in the institutions, behaviors, and understandings that form the general political cul-
ture." Id. For an insightful essay discussing the role of the Constitution as a unifying force in
shaping a common political culture, see Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cul-
tural Identity, 64 N.C.L. REV. 303 (1986). Karst takes a somewhat more sympathetic view of
the judiciary's role in our constitutional system:
In our society, one of the most prominent bridges between ideology and behavior is
the law, particularly constitutional law. It is fair to say that the Constitution today is
our pre-eminent symbol of nationhood and that the doctrine of judicial review is a
major practical support for both the attitudinal and the behavioral elements of the
American civic culture.
Id. at 373 (footnote omitted).
6. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 155.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Nagel characterizes Brown v. Board of Education as "the ful-
crum on which the world of judicial review was made to move decisively." R. NAGEL, supra
note 1, at 4. He seems particularly concerned that Brown be satisfactorily reconciled with his
thesis of excessive judicial encroachment. He argues that, although Brown "departed from
powerful evidence regarding the intended consequences of the equal protection clause and
because it rested on dubious and transient social scientific findings," the decision nevertheless
was consistent with the prevalent political culture outside the South. Id. at 4-5. Unlike many
of the other controversial Supreme Court decisions after Brown that, in Nagel's view, have
assaulted the popular culture, "Brown confirmed and enforced the understanding of 'equal
protection of the laws' held and practiced by the dominant national culture." Id. at 5. In light
of the controversy engendered throughout the country by the progeny of Brown (for example,
in the school busing and affirmative action areas), many might wonder whether Nagel's char-
acterization of Brown's consistency with the "dominant national culture" is a bit too simplistic.
8. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 155.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 3-4.
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should refrain from holding unconstitutional the determinations of other
branches of government, and instead reserve "the judiciary's power to invali-
date the decisions of other institutions.., for those special occasions when
some aberrant governmental action is emphatically inconsistent with consti-
tutional theory, text, and public understanding as expressed in prolonged
practice.""'
What is the underlying reason for the Supreme Court's supposed "as-
sault" on our country's general culture? Or, as Nagel puts it, why has the
Constitution come to be represented by hundreds of volumes of judicial in-
terpretation that purport to set forth prudential and moral principles rele-
vant to almost any public issue? Professor Nagel has no hesitancy in
supplying the answer. Lawyers, who are nurtured by legal training that em-
phasizes argumentative skills, have made constant reinterpretation seem al-
most indispensable to our conception of the Constitution. Nagel claims that
lawyers almost never seek simple and clear meanings; rather, in order to be
successful, lawyers must possess acute sensitivity to the potential for intellec-
tual uncertainty. Indeed, legal training emphasizes "interpretation"
grounded in nuances. Lawyers necessarily will present arguments in a way
that stretches existing "interpretation" to accommodate even the most ex-
traordinary factual situations. In this manner, "the inhibition against dis-
puting even core meanings begins to weaken. '"2
To Nagel, this continual "interpretation" and "reinterpretation" of consti-
tutional meaning has serious implications for the stability of political order.
To the extent that the Constitution's meaning is seen as constantly changing,
the social consensus claimed to be embodied in the Constitution is
weakened.
Nagel devotes a good deal of attention to first amendment cases to support
his thesis about overreaching judicial review. He uses notorious cases such
as Cohen v. California, 3 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 4 and Miller v.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 20.
13. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Court overturned on first amendment grounds a
breach of the peace conviction that was based on the wearing of a jacket displaying the words
"Fuck the Draft." In criticizing the Cohen decision, Nagel describes the jacket message as
consisting of "three tasteless and almost contentless words ...." R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at
45. While most people might agree with Nagel's characterization of the message's taste, it is
difficult to understand what he means by characterizing the message as "almost contentless."
The vast majority of people probably would understand the message to mean that Cohen did
not think highly of the draft.
14. 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (a town may not apply special restrictions to drive-in movies that
show nudity).
1989]
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California " to support his contention that "the judiciary's use of elaborate
explanations and high-sounding principles to resolve specific cases, including
many that are extreme and difficult, erects obstacles to an enhanced public
appreciation of free speech."' 6 Nagel asserts that these types of decisions
will cause the public to begin to ask why, if "freedom of speech is so impor-
tant, is it so often invoked to protect seemingly silly, unsavory, or dangerous
activities?"' 
7
Certainly, the Supreme Court's recent flag burning decision, Texas v.
Johnson, 8 is one in which the Court's decision probably lacks widespread
"public appreciation."' 9 Professor Nagel would without doubt characterize
the flag burning case, in light of the immediate public outcry that followed
the decision, as another example of excessive judicial encroachment. In line
with what Nagel believes the public has come to expect, Justice Brennan's
opinion for the five-member majority contained a ringing exposition of the
"high-sounding principles" upon which controversial first amendment cases
are made to stand.2 ° But, will most Americans disagree with the majority's
assertion that Texas prosecuted Johnson because of the conlent of his
message, rather than the particular method he chose to express his message,
in light of the fact that many alternative modes of expressing his views were
available to him?
2 1
Perhaps many will disagree with the majority's view of the first amend-
ment. Therefore, one may be quite sympathetic to Nagel's concern that de-
cisions of this kind damage public understanding and appreciation for the
principle of freedom of speech.2 2 Nevertheless, despite this quite legitimate
15. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Although Miller dealt with the mailing of sexually explicit mater-
ials, Nagel concluded that "[n]ude dancing apparently is a protected activity ... if it does not
violate the obscenity standard set forth in Miller." R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 45 n.108.
16. R. NAGEL, supra note i, at 47.
17. Id.
18. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
19. Another example of a first amendment case decided this past term that most likely
lacks widespread popular support is the dial-a-porn case, Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989) (Congress may ban dial-a-porn services that are obscene,
but a total ban on indecent telephone messages violates the first amendment).
20. For example, Justice Brennan declared:
We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag's deservedly cherished place in our
community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision
is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best
reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson's is a
sign and source of our strength .... It is the Nation's resilience, not its rigidity, that
Texas sees reflected in the flag - and it is that resilience that we reassert today.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547.
21. Id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Cf Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,
1988 DUKE L.J. 685. Dean Hafen argues that first amendment decisions that place too much
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concern, Nagel's plea that generally avoiding judicial review in such cases
may prevent further damage to the body politic seems draconian.2 3 While
Nagel acknowledges that protection of individual rights may require fre-
quent judicial intervention,2 4 he does not provide much guidance concerning
the basis upon which courts should decide in a particular case whether to
avoid review. The answer surely cannot turn upon the results of the latest,
or even the most respected, public opinion polls, nor does Nagel suggest that
it should.25
Nagel's critique of the Court's jurisprudence in cases involving federalism
and equal protection issues is also forceful and, as in the first amendment
area, supported by extensive discussion of the precedent that concerns him.
He argues that the modern decisions reflect a strong bias in favor of protect-
ing individual rights at the expense of the structural principles of federalism
and separation of powers:
The frame of mind that is created by concentration on the direct,
tangible protection of individuals does not easily appreciate the less
determinate requirements of constitutional structure. A judicial
system deeply engaged in achieving immediate justice for all indi-
viduals will not be sensitive to, or much interested in, the intellec-
tual and emotional preconditions for political competition between
26sovereigns.
As one might suspect, Nagel is critical of the Supreme Court's decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 27 because of the
stress on individual rights, to the exclusion of the institutional values embodied in the amend-
ment, exact a toll on the cohesiveness of the political community. Moreover, Hafen states that
the emphasis on individualism may have grown "cancerous" to the extent that it is undermin-
ing such institutions as family, church, and local community. Id. at 703. "[T]he American
approach has become so individualistic and unbalanced that it has severed the connections
between personal values and social values that European approaches have retained." Id. The
first amendment must protect institutional as well as individual interests. These institutional
interests sustain and nurture individual development and are the source of social and political
continuity for our society. Id. at 704.
23. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 58.
24. Id. at 59.
25. It may be appropriate here to point out that while the premise of Nagel's book rests
upon the asserted substantial divergence between what he calls the "legal" and "political"
cultures, see supra note 5, he makes no attempt to provide any support for this proposition,
either by way of empirical studies or even anecdotal evidence. For example, Nagel does not
cite or rely upon any studies or other evidence to gauge public opinion on the controversial
Supreme Court decisions he criticizes. Thus, he never establishes, or even attempts to estab-
lish, that the "legal culture" is out of step with the "political culture" to the extent assumed.
26. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 82.
27. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Garcia overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). The Court in National League of Cities held that the extension of the Fair Labor
Standards Act's wage and hour provisions to most state employees was unconstitutional as a
1989]
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Court's unwillingness to engage in the same type of case-by-case balancing
process to protect the values inherent in federalism that it so often uses in
the first amendment and equal protection areas.2" According to Nagel, the
Garcia Court's distaste for grappling on a case-by-case basis with the "tradi-
tional government function" test that had been set forth in National League
of Cities v. Usery2 9 is contrary to the Court's enthusiasm for applying
equally ephemeral balancing tests in cases involving the protection of indi-
vidual rights.30 Nagel concludes that in its zeal to protect individual rights,
the Court, as the prompt overruling of National League of Cities illustrates,
has not been nearly as interested as it ought to be in protecting and main-
taining the allocation of powers that the framers built into our federal
system.3
Nagel's book constitutes an important contribution to the controversy
about the Court's role in public policy formulation, particularly in light of
cases such as the flag burning and abortion decisions3 2 of this past term.
One of the real virtues of Constitutional Cultures, aside from the fact that
Nagel's prose is eminently readable, is the extent to which he has provided
the reader with the authority upon which he relies for his critique. The book
contains sixty-nine pages of notes, 33 a testament to the fact that Nagel al-
most never discusses a point without citation to specific authorities. Conse-
quently, Constitutional Cultures will make a handy reference tool for the
practicing lawyer, as well as the intended grist for the mill worked by consti-
tutional scholars.
Despite Nagel's considerable achievement, ultimately his book is unsatis-
fying in one important respect. Having identified what he regards as the
serious threat posed by the modern Supreme Court's jurisprudence, he offers
very little in terms of concrete suggestions for change. In fact, he admits
that "I have no definite prescriptions for what the Court's roles ought to be
violation of the tenth amendment and would impair the State's ability to act effectively in a
federalistic system of government. Id.
28. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 60-65.
29. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
30. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 60-72. As Justice Powell pointed out in dissent in Garcia,
"the luxury of precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general
provisions of our Constitution." 469 U.S. at 561 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). Moreover, by
refusing to engage in a balancing process that would take into account the asserted federal and
state interests, Justice Powell charged that the majority "ignore[d] the role ofjudicial review in
our system of government." Id. at 561.
31. R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 83.
32. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
33. See R. NAGEL, supra note 1, at 157-226.
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or even how it should write its opinions."34 Although Nagel does offer a
plea for the Court to abandon what he calls its "formulaic" style in favor of
a communicative style that is more in tune with the prevailing political cul-
ture, he is vague as to how this change actually would be accomplished, or
what it would mean as a practical matter. One is left with the feeling that
Nagel is still pondering whether other ways exist, perhaps more substantive
than stylistic, for requiring "that courts accomplish less."" Hopefully once
formulated, those ideas will be forthcoming in a work as provocative as Con-
stitutional Cultures.
34. Id. at 155.
35. Id.
1989]

